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Abstract: We study boundedly rational players in an interactive situation. Each player follows
a simple choice procedure in which he reacts optimally against a combination of actions of his
opponents drawn at random from the distribution generated by a player's beliefs. By imposing
a consistency requirement we obtain an equilibrium notion which we call regret equilibrium.A n
existence proof is provided and it is shown that the concept survives the iterated elimination
of never-best responses. Additional properties are studied and the regret equilibrium concept
is compared with other game theoretic solution concepts. The regret equilibrium concept is
illustrated by means of interesting examples. It is shown that in the centipede game, players
will continue to play with large probability.
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Traditional economic analysis rests on two fundamental assumptions. First, economic agents
have a particular goal, e.g. utility or prot maximization. Second, economic agents behave
in such a way that these goals are achieved within the limits imposed by given constraints.
Simon (1976) refers to this kind of behavior as being substantively rational. Whenever the
assumptions with respect to utility or prot maximization and substantive rationality hold,
incorporating behavioral considerations in economic analysis is superﬂuous.
Economics became concerned with human cognitive processes originated in psychology when
uncertainty and expectations became an explicit part of the models. Cournot, for example,
showed that the notion of prot-maximization is ill-dened in an oligopoly market. The quanti-
ty that would be substantively rational for each rm depends on the choices made by the other
rms: no rm can choose without making assumptions about how others will choose. Thus, the
presence of uncertainty prevents them from acting substantively rational. However, as stated
by Simon (1976), being boundedly rational does not prevent the rms from being procedurally
rational. Procedural rationality means that behavior is the outcome of some process of appro-
priate reasoning given available knowledge and computational capabilities. See also Rubinstein
(1997).
In games players make choices based on an association between actions and consequences.
We consider a game theoretic model in which the players behave according to a very simple
procedure of deliberation. Facing a certain situation, i.e. given a pure strategy prole of the
opponents this procedure prescribes that each best response is played with equal probability. If
a player faces a mixed strategy prole of his opponents, he is confronted with uncertainty. In
those situations regret considerations may become important. A player ends up feeling regret in
case the chosen action was not a best response ex post. We focus on static, one-shot games where
a mixed strategy means that each player does choose a pure strategy, but this pure strategy
is drawn from the probability distribution over his strategy set induced by the player's mixed
strategy. We assume that a player has beliefs about the mixed strategy prole of his opponents.
Thus, a player can determine the probability distribution over the pure strategy proles of his
opponents from these beliefs. Each player assumes that the realized pure strategy prole of his
opponents is randomly drawn from this distribution. Given the procedure described above, he
would react to such a realization by playing each of his best responses with equal probability.
We now assume that he uses his beliefs to weigh each of these reactions accordingly. Thus,
the procedure together with the player's beliefs about the mixed strategies of his opponents
determines the mixed strategy of the player. The equilibrium requirement of our concept is that
the beliefs of each player about the other players' behavior are consistent with the other players'
behavior. Consequently, in equilibrium each player plays a pure strategy with a probability
equal to the probability that this strategy does not give rise to regret.
1The notion of Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium concept introduced by Osborne and
Rubinstein (1997) also require the beliefs to be consistent with the other players' behavior.
However, they dier with respect to the way in which players construct beliefs about the conse-
quences of their actions. The notion of Nash equilibrium prescribes that each player constructs
probabilistic beliefs about the other players' behavior. Furthermore, given these beliefs each
player associates a distribution of consequences to each action. In the equilibrium concept of
Osborne and Rubinstein each player constructs beliefs about the consequences of his actions by
sampling each action and associating a consequence with each action independently.
The concept of Osborne and Rubinstein (1997) aims at constructing a procedure in case
the players have limited knowledge of the economic environment. Contrary to both the Nash
equilibrium and our concept, they do not require players to know the relationship between
their own action, the other players' actions, and the outcome. Their players only need to know
their own set of possible actions. However, Osborne and Rubinstein do assume players to be
able to compare outcomes resulting from dierent action proles of the other players. This
is not necessary in our model where a very simple preference relation for each player suces.
In particular, our players do not have to be able to compare lotteries over outcomes or even
outcomes resulting from dierent action proles of the opponents. Furthermore, giventhe actions
of the opponents, we allow for the possibility that a player cannot compare some of his actions;
he only must be able to determine all best responses.
As mentioned before, regret considerations become important whenever people face uncer-
tain situations. In a decision theoretic set-up such situations are modelled by lotteries, see
Loomes and Sudgen (1982). Their aim was to give a simple explanation of the observations in
the experiments of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Regret considerations in a dynamic game
theoretic setting are studied by Hart and Mas-Colell (1997).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we dene terminology that is used
throughout the paper. The regret equilibrium notion is derived from the corresponding proce-
dure in Section 3. This section also includes the existence result and some results concerning
weakly and strictly dominated strategies. Section 4 concerns the structure and size of the set
of regret equilibria. In Section 5 we compare our concept with other solution concepts in non-
cooperative game theory. Section 6 applies the equilibrium concept to several classes of games,
including a Rock-Scissors-Paper game, a class of Hawk-Dove games, and two-person coordina-
tion games. We proceed by applying the regret equilibrium concept to extensive form games,
in particular the centipede game. It is shown that the equilibrium concept provides a potential
resolution of the paradoxical ﬂavor of this game: The equilibrium conditions indicate that the
players understand the structure of the centipede game, but still want to continue at the early
stages of the game with a relatively large probability. Section 7 concludes.
22 Preliminaries
This section denes some standard game theoretic notions which are used hereafter. A (strategic)
game is a tuple G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni,w h e r eN=f 1 ;:::;ngis a nite set of players; each
player i 2 N has a nite set Si of pure strategies and a binary relation i over
Q
i2N Si, reﬂecting
his preferences over the outcomes. The binary relation i is assumed to be reﬂexive and its
asymmetric part i, dened for all s;t 2
Q
i2N Si by
s i t , s i t and not t i s;
is assumed to be acyclic. In the following we also consider cases in which the preference
relations i induce von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions i :
Q
i2N Si ! I R and de-
note the corresponding game by G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni. For notational convenience we
write S =
Q
i2N Si, S−i =
Q
j2NnfigSj; for a strategy tuple s =( s 1 ;:::;s n) 2 S we denote
s−i =( s 1;:::;s i−1;s i+1;:::;s n) and, with a slight abuse of notation, s =( s i ;s −i). We denote
by
i := fi : Si ! I R j8 s i2S i: i( s i)0 ;
X
s i2 S i
 i( s i)=1 g
the set of mixed strategies for player i; analogous to the pure strategy case, we use notations ,
−i,  =(  i; −i). For a mixed strategy prole −i,w ew r i t e − i( s − i ): =
Q
j 2 Nnfigj(sj), the
probability that the opponents of player i play the strategy prole s−i 2 S−i.
Consider a game hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni. Denote for each player i 2 N and each prole
s−i 2 S−i of pure strategies of his opponents the set of pure best replies, i.e., the pure strategies
that player i cannot improve upon, by Bi(s−i):
Bi(s−i): =f s i2S ij6 9~ si 2 Si :( ~ s i;s −i) i(s i;s −i)g:
Of course, for games hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni with utility functions we have:
Bi(s−i): =f s i2S ij8 ~ s i2S i: i( s i;s −i) i(~ si;s −i)g:
Since Si is nite and i is acyclic, Bi(s−i) is nonempty. In a game hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni,w e
call a pure strategy si 2 Si a never-best response if
fs−i 2 S−i j si 2 Bi(s−i)g = ;:




for each s−i 2 S−i. A pure strategy si 2 Si is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy i 2 i if
8s−i 2 S−i : i(i;s −i) i(s i;s −i)
with strict inequality for at least one s−i,a n dstrictly dominated if all inequalities are strict. A
strictly dominated strategy is clearly a never-best response.
33M o d e l
The players in our model base their mixed strategy on their beliefs about the strategy prole of
the opponents and on a very simple procedure. Each player i 2 N has beliefs about the strategy
prole of his opponents, in the sense that he believes his opponents adopt a strategy prole
−i 2 −i. We focus on one-shot games, where a mixed strategy means that each player does
play a pure strategy, but this pure strategy is drawn from the probability distribution over his
strategy set induced by a player's mixed strategy. Hence, the player is uncertain about the exact
pure strategy prole s−i 2 S−i that will be chosen by his opponents. In the Nash equilibrium
context, players use their beliefs to calculate expected payos. In our model, players reason
dierently. Since they are playing a one-shot game, they are sure that in the end they will face a
pure strategy prole of the opponents. If they do not play a best response to this pure strategy
prole they will feel regret. This consideration is due to the uncertainty of the situation that
is coming from the beliefs that the players have. We assume that each player i 2 N adopts
a very simple procedure. Given a pure strategy prole s−i of his opponents, he will play each
best response to s−i with equal probability. Each player assumes that the realized pure strategy
prole of his opponents is drawn from the probability distribution over the pure strategy proles
that is induced by his beliefs. Thus, using this procedure, a player would be able to react to each
realization ex post. However, ex ante the realized pure strategy prole is stochastic. Players
now use their beliefs about the proles of the opponents to weigh their reactions accordingly.
Consequently, a player plays each of his pure strategies with a certain probability, that is an
outcome of the procedure together with his beliefs. The equilibrium requirement of our concept
is that the beliefs of each player about the other players' behavior are consistent with the other
players' behavior: we require correctness of beliefs.
We rst give an example and then derive the equilibrium conditions in the general case.
Consider the two-player game in Figure 1, where  2 (0;1). Player 1 has two pure strategies,
A and B. Player 2 has three pure strategies, a, b,a n dc . We ignore the payos to player 2
abc
A 1 ; 0 2 ; 0 3 ; 0
B 3+;0 1+;0 2+;0
Figure 1: Regret considerations
in this example and focus on the situation for player 1. Assume that player 1 believes that
his opponent will play each of his pure strategies with equal probability, i.e., that his opponent
plays 2 =( 1
3;1
3;1
3). Hence, player 1 considers each of the realizations a;b,a n dcto be equally
likely. If the observation is a, his unique best response is to play B, in the other cases he should
play his unique best response A. According to the procedure and the beliefs, the probability
4that player 1 will play A is then 2
3, and that he will play B is 1
3, which determines his mixed
strategy.
In general, what equilibrium conditions does the above imply? Consider a strategy prole
 2 a n dap l a y e ri2N . What is the probability that player i will choose to play a strategy
si 2 Si if he follows the above procedure and believes that his opponents play according to −i?
Player i will not play si in response to a pure strategy prole s−i to which si is not a pure best
reply. Now suppose that si is indeed a pure best reply to s−i; the probability of event s−i, i.e.,
the probability that i's opponents play s−i,e q u a l s − i ( s − i ). Given this event, he will play all
pure best replies to s−i with equal probability and consequently will play si with probability
1
jBi(s−i)j. Summarizing, given a prole −i of player i's opponents, the probability that player i






−i(s−i)= :r i( s i; −i); (1)
where the empty sum is zero by denition. In equilibrium, every player's beliefs must be correct,
so expression (1) should equal player i's probability of playing si, i(si).
The expression for ri(si; −i) in (1) can be interpreted as player i's probability of not feeling
regret after playing si. Necessary for not feeling regret of si is that si is a best reply to the
played strategy. If there were more than one pure best reply, he feels regret for not being able
to play the other pure best replies. This last type of regret might seem strange, but it can be
compared to the regret of not choosing an equally pleasing destination for your vacation: you
are aware that some alternative destinations are just as good, but it is still unpleasant that you
cannot be in more places at the same time.
Notice that in Figure 1 the probability that player 1 feels no regret if he plays A equals 2
3;i f
he plays B it equals 1
3. Given beliefs 2 =( 1
3;1
3;1
3), the expected payo of playing A is 2 and of
playing B,2+ . Hence an expected utility maximizing player 1 would select B with probability
one.
Summarizing, we dene our equilibrium notion as follows:
Denition 3.1 Let G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni be a game. A mixed strategy prole  2  is a
regret equilibrium if for every player i 2 N and for every si 2 Si:
i(si)=r i( s i; −i): (2)
The set of regret equilibria of a game G is denoted by RE(G).
The following proposition shows that regret equilibria exist for every game.
Proposition 3.2 Let G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni be a game. Then RE(G) 6= ;.





s i 2 S i
X
f s − i 2 S − i j s i 2 B i ( s − i ) g
1
j B i ( s − i ) j
 − i ( s − i )
=
X
s − i 2 S − i
X
s i 2 B i ( s − i )
1
j B i ( s − i ) j
 − i ( s − i )
=
X
s − i 2 S − i
 − i ( s − i )
=1 :
Hence the mapping
r : ! 
 7! r()
with r()i(si)=r i ( s i ; −i) is well-dened. In the denition (1) of the function ri neither the
index set in the summation sign nor the number jBi(s−i)j of pure best responses depends on
the strategy combination . Hence, this mapping is obviously continuous. Application of the
Brouwer x point theorem yields the existence of a strategy prole  2  such that  = r(),
which is a regret equilibrium.
2




s i 2 S ir i ( s i ; −i)f o re a c h
2 ;i 2 N. As a consequence, one of the conditions i(si)=r i ( s i ; −i)o fp l a y e riis
redundant.
A game H is said to be obtained by iterated elimination of never-best responses from a game
G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni if there exists a number k 2 I N of elimination rounds and for each
player i 2 N a collection of sets S0
i ;S1
i;:::;Sk
i and a sequence 0
i;1
i;:::; k
i of relations such
that:




2. For each player i 2 N and each l =0 ;1 ;:::;k:  l
i is the preference relation i from the




3. For each l =0 ;1 ;:::;k−1t h e r ee x i s t sap l a y e ri2Nsuch that Sl
i nSl+1
i is nonempty and
contains only never-best responses of player i in the game hN;(Sl
i)i2N;(l
i)i2Ni;
4. H is the game hN;(Sk
i)i2N;(k
i)i2Ni;
5. In the game H,n op l a y e ri2Nhas never-best responses.
The behavior of the regret equilibrium concept with respect to dominated strategies and elimi-
nation thereof is summarized in the next result.
6Proposition 3.4 The following results hold:
(i) In a regret equilibrium  of a game hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni never-best responses are played
with zero probability.
Moreover,
(ii) the set of regret equilibria of a game G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni e q u a l s|u pt oz e r op r o b a -
bility assigned to eliminated pure strategies | the set of regret equilibria of a game that is
obtained by iterated elimination of never-best responses.
Finally,
(iii) let G = hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni be a game with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
and let  be a regret equilibrium of G.I fp l a y e ri 's pure strategy si is weakly dominated
by the mixed strategy i,t h e n :
for all si 2 Si : if i(si) > 0; then 
i (si)  
i(si):
Proof. The proof of (i) is easy: if si 2 Si is a never-best response, then the set fs−i 2 S−i j
si 2 Bi(s−i)g is empty and hence according to (2): 
i (si)=r i( s i;
−i)=0 .
To prove (ii), it suces to prove that the rst round of eliminations does not change the
equilibrium set, since the proof can then be repeated for the additional rounds. Assume for
simplicity that in this rst elimination round we eliminate all the never-best responses
NBi := fsi 2 Si j si is a never-best response of player i in Gg
of each player i 2 N, thus obtaining a smaller game G0. The equilibrium conditions in the game
G are that for each i 2 N and each si 2 Si:
i(si)=r i ( s i ; −i)
=
X






























7By (i), strategies sj 2 NBj are played with zero probability in a regret equilibrium. Hence the
second sum in the last equality above equals zero. What remains, for each player i 2 N and
each strategy si 2 Si n NBi, are exactly the equilibrium conditions for the game G0.
To prove (iii), assume w.l.o.g. that si 2 Bi(s−i). Since i weakly dominates si and si 2
Bi(s−i), for every si 2 Si such that i(si) > 0 we must have that si 2 Bi(s−i):
fs−i 2 S−i j si 2 Bi(s−i)gf s − i2S − ijs i2B i( s − i) g ;
which together with the denition of ri(;
−i) implies the result:
i(si) > 0 ) 



















Notice that the result above does not rule out that weakly dominated strategies are played with
positive, even quite large probability.
Example 3.5 Consider the game in Figure 2. T weakly dominates B and L strictly dominates
R. T is a best response against L, but player 1 will regret not playing the other best response B





 2( L )+ 2( R ) :
The condition for 1(B) is redundant, since the probabilities have to add up to one. Similarly,
f o rp l a y e r2w es e et h a tLis a unique best response to both T and B, so that his equilibrium
condition becomes
2(L)= 1( T)+ 1(B):
Solving these equations and taking into acount that (1; 2)2 1 2 we nd that the unique
regret equilibrium equals ((1
2; 1
2);(1;0)). Observe that the weakly dominated strategy is not only
played with positive probability, but that there is not even an alternative strategy with a higher
probability.
LR
T 1 ; 1 1 ; 0
B 1 ; 1 0 ; 0
Figure 2: The game from Example 3.5
84 The size and structure of the set of regret equilibria
The size of an equilibrium set can be seen as a measure of the cutting power of an equilibrium
concept. With respect to the size of the set of regret equilibria of a game hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni,
remark that it is always a relatively small subset of . A strategy tuple −i 2 −i completely
determines ri(; −i) and hence in an n-player game it suces to know only n − 1c o m p o n e n t s
of a regret equilibrium to compute the equilibrium strategy for the remaining n-th player. This
implies that RE(G) is always of lower dimension than . In particular, it is impossible that
RE(G)= .
The structure of the set of Nash equilibria has been studied by several authors, including
Winkels (1979) and Jansen (1981), who show that in two-person games the set of Nash equilibria
has a nice decomposition into a nite number of polytopes. Concerning the structure of the set
of regret equilibria, we see that if the game G has only two players, then RE(G) is a polytope,
since the set of regret equilibria is then determined by nitely many linear equations and linear
weak inequalities in the variables (i(si))i2N;si2Si. If the game has at least three players, its
set of regret equilibria is determined by a set of polynomial equations over a Cartesian product
of simplices. This leads to the observations that | analogous to the set of Nash equilibria |
the set of regret equilibria may be curved or disconnected. The following two examples indicate
that both possibilities indeed occur.
Example 4.1 Consider the three player game in Figure 3. Here we denote by p;q;r 2 [0;1]
the probability with which player 1 chooses his rst row, player 2 chooses his rst column, and
player 3 chooses his rst matrix, respectively.
q 1 − q
p 1;1;1 1;0;0
1 − p 0;1;1 0;0;0
r
q 1 − q
p 1;0;0 0;1;1
1 − p 0;0;0 1;1;1
1 − r
Figure 3: A game with a curved set of regret equilibria
Considering Remark 3.3, it suces to determine an equilibrium constraint only for p;q,a n dr ,
since those for 1−p;1−q;1−r will follow immediately. The rst strategy (the top row) of player
1 is a unique best response to three combinations of pure strategies of his opponents, namely to
those in which player 2 chooses either his rst or his second column and player 3 chooses the
rst matrix, which occurs with probability qr +( 1−q) r, and to the strategy in which player 2
chooses his rst column and player 3 chooses the second matrix, which occurs with probability
q(1−r). Together with the constraints for the other two players, we nd that the conditions for
9a regret equilibrium are
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
p = qr +( 1−q) r+q(1 − r)=q +( 1−q) r
q = pr +( 1−p ) r = r
r = pq +( 1−p ) q = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
Consequently, the set of regret equilibria equals
f((p;1− p);(q;1−q);(r;1− r)) j p = q(2− q);r=q;q 2 [0;1]g;
which is a curved equilibrium set.
Example 4.2 Consider the three player game in Figure 4.
q 1 − q
p 1;1;1 0;0;0
1 − p 0;0;1 1;1;0
r
q 1 − q
p 0;0;0 1;1;1
1 − p 1;1;0 0;0;1
1 − r
Figure 4: A game with a disconnected set of regret equilibria
The conditions for a regret equilibrium are
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
p = qr+( 1−q)(1− r)=2 qr −q −r +1
q = pr +( 1−p )(1− r)=2 pr − p − r +1
r = pq +( 1−p ) q = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
This is equivalent with (after substitution of r = q):
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
p =2 q 2 − 2 q +1
q =2 pq − p − q +1
r = q
p;q;r 2 [0;1]
Subtracting the rst equality from the second, we nd:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :





> > > > > <
> > > > > :






> > > > > <
> > > > > :
























consisting of three components.
5 Comparison with other solutions
Osborne and Rubinstein (1997) introduce a procedure in which a player samples all his pure
strategies once and chooses the one which yields | in that particular sample | the highest
payo (breaking ties equi-probably). Comparing this to our procedure, we observe that in the
Osborne and Rubinstein procedure a player only needs to know his set of pure strategies, but
he must be able to compare all outcomes in S. In our procedure, the players must know more,
but need to be able to compare less than in their procedure. In particular,
 the players must know the possible outcomes S =
Q
i2N Si,
 they are required only to be able to perform a very simple kind of comparative statics:
given a prole s−i 2 S−i of pure strategies for his opponents, player i only needs to
determine whether or not a strategy si 2 Si can be improved upon.
This very limited type of comparisons is similar to those made by a player in the notion of
pure Nash equilibrium. Notice that a very simple preference relation for a player suces: It is
not necessary to compare lotteries over outcomes, not even outcomes that arise facing dierent
strategies of the opponents. This last point is particularly important: The players are not
required to compare outcomes arising from very `exotic' what-if situations. Only responses to
the same environment, i.e., to the same combination of pure strategies of their opponents, are
compared. This allows the nature of the payo (money, days of vacation, :::) to be dierent for
each combination of strategies of the opponents.
Moreover, even if the prole of pure strategies of the opponents is xed, a player is not
required to be able to compare all his strategies, only to be able to determine all best responses.
Hence even the order on f(si;s −i)js i2S igneed not be complete.
Chen, Friedman, and Thisse (1997), using a model in which players have subconscious utility
functions, consider socalled boundedly rational Nash equilibria with equilibrium requirements
similar to those in our model.
Despite the relatively prudent behavior with respect to (weakly) dominated strategies as
expressed in Proposition 3.4, the set of regret equilibria and Nash equilibria have no obvious









2)). We can, however, indicate a relation with the notion
of strict equilibria introduced by Harsanyi (1973) as those strategy proles  satisfying the
11LR
T 0 ; 2 2 ; 0
B 1 ; 0 0 ; 1
Figure 5: The Nash and regret equilibrium concept dier
condition that each player plays his unique best response to the strategies of the opponent:
8i 2 N : fig = fi 2 i j6 9~ i : i(~ i; −i)> i(  i; −i)g:
It is clear that a strict Nash equilibrium is always a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and (con-
sequently) that strict Nash equilibria not always exist. However, if they exist, they are exactly
the pure strategy regret equilibria of the game.
Proposition 5.1 The set of strict Nash equilibria of a game hN;(Si)i2N;(i)i2Ni coincides with
the set of pure strategy regret equilibria.
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader.
The results with respect to the iterated elimination of never-best responses in Proposition 3.4
call to mind the notion of rationalizability introduced in Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
Without going into the formal denitions, it follows immediately from Proposition 3.4 and
Bernheim (1984, pp. 1015-1016) that every action that is played with positive probability in a
regret equilibrium is rationalizable. However, in a regret equilibrium , the mixed strategies i
themselves need not be rationalizable.
6E x a m p l e s
In this section we apply the concept of a regret equilibrium to several classes of games, including
two-person coordination games and a class of Hawk-Dove games. Moreover, one can apply the
concept of a regret equilibrium to the reduced strategic form of extensive games. We present
one brief example and one more elaborate case, in which we solve a T-choice centipede game.
R;q1 S;q2 P;1− q1 −q2
R;p1 0;0 1;−1 −1;1
S;p2 −1;1 0;0 1;−1
P;1−p1 − p2 1;−1 −1;1 0;0
Figure 6: Rock, Scissors, Paper
Example 6.1 Consider the Rock, Scissors, Paper game in Figure 6, where R, S, P, have the
obvious meaning and the corresponding probabilities with which these strategies are played are
12denoted by pi;q i. The conditions for a regret equilibrium are
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > :
p1 = q2
p2 =1 − q 1 − q 2
q 1 = p 2
q 2 =1 − p 1 − p 2
p 1 ;p 2;q 1;q 2 2 [0;1]
p1 + p2  1
q1 + q2  1
Simple calculus leads to the conclusion that the unique regret equilibrium equals the unique
Nash equilibrium in which both players choose each of their pure strategies with probability 1
3.
Example 6.2 A two-player game is a coordination game if both players have the same set of
pure strategies and the unique best response to a pure strategy of the opponent is to play the
same strategy. An example of a coordination game is the Battle of the Sexes game given in




Figure 7: Battle of the Sexes; a coordination game
playing a pure strategy if and only if his opponent plays the same strategy. As a consequence,
a prole of mixed strategies is a regret equilibrium if and only if both players play the same
mixed strategy. This illustrates an important dierence with the Nash equilibrium concept: The
pure Nash equilibria of a coordination game are the combinations of pure strategies in which
the players indeed coordinate (choose the same pure strategy). Since these Nash equilibria are
strict, they are also regret equilibria. However, there may be mixed strategy Nash equilibria in





5)). The regret equilibrium concept provides | in our opinion | a
much more intuitive solution.
Example 6.3 In this example we consider a class of Hawk-Dove games with the structure of
the payo matrix given in Figure 8. Here V and W are real numbers satisfying the condition
W<V . We consider several cases.
q 1 − q
p V;V 0;2V
1−p 2V;0 W; W
Figure 8: A class of Hawk-Dove games
131. If W>0, we have a Prisoner's dilemma; both players have a strictly dominating strategy.
The unique regret equilibrium equals ((0;1);(0;1)).


















p =1 − q
q =1 − p
p;q 2 [0;1]
The set of regret equilibria is f((p;1− p);(1− p;p)) j p 2 [0;1]g.














5. If V< 0, the rst strategy of both players strictly dominates the second, so the unique
regret equilibrium is ((1;0);(1;0)).
Example 6.4 Consider the extensive form game in Figure 9. In this game, player 1 is given
t h ec h o i c et os t o p( S )o rc o n t i n u e( C ). If he continues, player 2 is given the same choice. The










Figure 9: An extensive form game
Assume that c 1 a and c 2 b. Consequently, we have that the outcome c is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Denote by p the probability that player 1 chooses
14to stop and by q the probability that player 2 chooses to stop. By Remark 3.3, it suces to
determine the equilibrium conditions for p and q. Player 2's choice to stop is not a best response
to player 1's strategy to continue. If player 1 stops, it is of little concern what player 2 chooses:





The equilibrium condition for player 1 is either p = q or p = 1
2q or p = 0, depending on
whether he nds a better than, equivalent to, or worse than outcome b. In the rst two cases,
i.e., if a 1 b, there is a Nash equilibrium yielding outcome a which is never played in a regret
equilibrium. No matter what preferences player 1 has over a and b, the unique regret equilibrium
in all cases is that both players decide to continue with probability one.
Example 6.5 In the T-choice centipede game, introduced by Rosenthal (1981), players 1 and
2 alternately move. In any of the 2T periods, the player whose turn it is to move can decide to
stop the game (S)o rt oc o n t i n u e( C ). Consequently, both players have T + 1 pure strategies:
stopping at any one of the T opportunities, or continue all the time. The game ends if one of
the players decides to stop or if neither player has decided to do so after each of them has had T
opportunities. For each player, the outcome when he stops the game in period t is better than
that in which the other player stops the game in period t + 1 (or the game ends), but worse
than any outcome that is reached if in period t +1 the other player passes the move to him. In
terms of regret:
Player 2 feels no regret of stopping at his k-th opportunity exactly in the following cases:
 player 1 stops immediately; then all of player 2's T +1pure strategies are a pure best
response;
 k = T; the unique best response to player 1's choice to continue always is to stop at the
nal stage;
 if player 1 decides to stop at opportunity k +1 .
Player 1 feels no regret of stopping at his k-th opportunity in exactly one case:
 if player 2 decides to stop in the next period, at his k-th opportunity.
An example of a 3-choice centipede game is given below.
Denote by pi(qi) the probability of player 1 (2) to stop at his i-th opportunity, once this
opportunity is reached (i =1 ;:::;T). Thus, our computations are in behavioral, rather than in
mixed strategies. We show that for each number T 2 I N of choices and each k 2f 0 ;:::;T−1g:





























Figure 10: A 3-choice centipede game
In particular, if the number of choices T approaches innity, the probability for each player
to stop at the rst (and by the same argument at any nite) opportunity, converges to zero.
This provides a potential resolution of the paradoxical aspect of the centipede game. In the
unique Nash equilibrium both players stop immediately with probability one, in the regret
equilibrium concept they stop immediately with positive probability, but the solution in (3)
indicates that there is a strong urge to continue playing, thus providing the possibility to achieve
more preferable outcomes.
The description of the T-choice centipede game in terms of regret (emphasized above) im-
mediately gives rise to the following conditions for player 1:
p1 = q1 (I:1)
(1 − p1)p2 =( 1−q 1) q 2 (I:2)

(1 − p1)(1− p2)(1− pT−1)pT =( 1−q 1)(1− q2)(1 − qT−1)qT; (I:T)








+( 1−p 1)(1 − p2)p3 (II:2)

(1− q1)(1− q2)(1 − qT−1)qT =
p1
T +1
+( 1−p 1)(1 − p2)(1 − pT): (II:T)
The conditions that arise from always continuing are redundant (see Remark 3.3).
We prove rst of all, that in the T-choice centipede game we have for each i =1 ;:::;T−1:
pi = qi;p i = 2f 0 ;1 g : (4)
This is necessary to avoid division by zero when we solve the game. We know from condition (I.1)
that p1 = q1. Suppose p1 = 1. Substitution in (II.1) yields 1 = 1
T+1, a contradiction. Suppose
p1 =0 .T h e np 2=q 2by (I.2) and p2 = 0 by (II.1). Hence p3 = q3 by (I.3) and p3 =0b y( I I . 2 ) .
16Proceeding in this fashion yields that pk = qk =0f o ra l lk=1 ;:::;T, which contradicts (II.T).
Hence p1 = q1;p 1 = 2f 0 ;1 g . Now assume that we have shown for some k 2f 1 ;:::;T−2g
8nk:p n=q n;p n = 2f 0 ;1 g :
We proceed to show that the same holds for k + 1. First of all, we have from (I.k+1) that
pk+1 = qk+1. Consider condition (II.k+1):
(1 − q1)(1− q2)(1 − qk)qk+1 =
p1
T +1
+( 1−p 1)(1− p2)(1 − pk+1)pk+2 | {z }
0
:
If qk+1 = 0, then its left hand side equals zero, which would imply that p1  0, whereas we know





a contradiction. This nishes the proof. This part was necessary to avoid division by zero in
the following solution of the game.





+( 1−p 1) p 2
(1 − p1)p2 =
p1
T +1
+( 1−p 1)(1− p2)p3

(1 − p1)(1− p2)(1− pT−1)pT =
p1
T +1
+( 1−p 1)(1− p2)(1− pT)
Obviously, the rst equation is equivalent to
T
T +1
p 1=( 1−p 1) p 2:






+( 1−p 1)(1− p2)p3;
which is equivalent to
T − 1
T +1
p 1=( 1−p 1)(1− p2)p3:




p 1=( 1−p 1)(1− p2)(1− p3)p4:
17Continuing in this way, we get the following equivalent system of T equations:
T
T +1
p 1 =( 1 − p 1 ) p 2
T − 1
T +1




p 1 =( 1 − p 1 )(1− p2)(1 − pT−1)pT
1
T +1
p 1 =( 1 − p 1 )(1− p2)(1 − pT−1)(1− pT):
The nal step is to roll it up backwards again. Add the last and the second last equation to get
3
T +1
p 1=( 1−p 1)(1 − p2)(1 − pT−1): (5)
In combination with the second last equation and (4), which assures that we do not divide by





Now start with equation (5) and rst, add the third last equation, and second, divide in a similar
way. This yields rst,
6
T +1









Now do this again with equation (6) in combination with the fourth last equation and get
10
T +1





























It is easy to see that




In particular, if the number of choices T approaches innity, the probability for each player
to stop at the rst (and by the same argument at any nite) opportunity, converges to zero.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1997), in computing their equilibrium notion in the centipede game,
conclude that their equilibrium notion makes sense only if both players fail to understand the
18structure of the game. In our equilibrium notion, the equilibrium conditions form an almost
immediate translation of the structure of the game, where it is a unique best response to stop
exactly one period ahead of your opponent's intent to do so. Still, we nd a potential resolution
of the paradox posed by the centipede game: The players play the unique Nash equilibrium of
stopping immediately with positive probability, but there is a strong urge to continue playing.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated a solution concept based on a simple procedure. Each player
plays optimally against a prole of pure strategies of the opponents that is randomly drawn
from the distribution over the set of their pure strategies that is induced by his beliefs about
the mixed strategies of his opponents. The notion of regret equilibrium follows by imposing a
consistency requirement. Most of the analysis was done for a very general class of games. Only
very simple types of comparisons are required of the players, since a player does not have to
compare lotteries or even outcomes that arise facing dierent strategies of the opponents. It
is sucient that for each prole of pure strategies of the opponent, a player is able to decide
whether or not his strategies are pure best responses. This makes the concept widely applicable.
References
Bernheim B.D. (1984): \Rationalizable Strategic Behavior", Econometrica, 52, 1007-1028.
Chen H-C., Friedman J.W., and Thisse J-F. (1997): \Boundedly Rational Nash Equili-
brium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach", Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 32-54.
Harsanyi J.C. (1973): \Games with Randomly Distributed Payos: A New Rationale for
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points", International Journal of Game Theory, 2, 1-23.
Hart S. and Mas-Colell A. (1997): \A Simple Adaptive Procedure leading to Correlated
Equilibrium", DP 126, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Jansen M.J.M. (1981): \Maximal Nash Subsets for Bimatrix Games", Naval Research Logis-
tics Quarterly, 28, 147-152.
Kahneman D. and Tversky A. (1979): \Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk", Econometrica, 47, 263-291.
19Loomes G. and Sudgen R. (1982): \Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice under Uncertainty", Economic Journal, 92, 805-824.
Osborne M. and Rubinstein A. (1997): \Games with Procedurally Rational Players", to
appear in American Economic Review.
Pearce D.G. (1984): \Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection", Eco-
nometrica, 52, 1029-1050.
Rosenthal R.W. (1981): \Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain-
Store Paradox", Journal of Economic Theory, 25, 92-100.
Rubinstein A. (1997): Modeling Bounded Rationality, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Simon H.A. (1976): \From Substantive to Procedural Rationality", in Method and Appraisal
in Economics, S.J. Latsis (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 129-148.
Winkels H.M. (1979): \An Algorithm to Determine all Equilibrium Points of a Bimatrix
Game", in Game Theory and Related Topics, O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke (eds.),
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 137-148.
20